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Abstract: This paper describes a systemic method towards standardization of a cyber weapon effectiveness and
effectiveness prediction process to promote consistency and improve cyber weapon system evaluation accuracy – for both
offensive and defensive postures. The approach included theoretical examination of existing effectiveness prediction
processes for kinetic and directed energy weapons, complemented with technical and social aspects of cyber realm. The
examination highlighted several paradigm-shifts needed to transition from purely kinetic-based processes and transition
into the realm of combined kinetic and cyber weapons. Components of the new method for cyber weapons are cyber
payload assessment, effects identification, and target assessment. The ultimate outcome of method is the ‘Probability of
Kill’ for a cyber weapon paired with a threat and within a given situation. This probability is a function of factors such as
intelligence gathered on the latency of information, access points, hardware and software configurations, accuracy and
completeness of network map, understanding of operations tempo; likelihood that vulnerabilities being exploited are
patched and IT’s ability to detect and respond to the delivery of the cyber payload; and probability that the payload will
achieve the desired mission effects. Aside from the use of this method for offensive purposes, it can also be mirrored as
cyber defense and can serve as basis for developing cyber defense strategies, such as focused counter intelligence on
access points, hardware and software configurations, and network map and architecture, comprehensive patching to
assure most current and complete patches are deployed, and well trained and equipped IT with ability to detect and
respond to cyber payloads.
Keyword: Systemic; Systematic; Offense; Defense; Risk; Effectiveness

1. Background
Offensive cyber operations (OCO) have been portrayed as an adjunct to conventional weapons and that
predictable time and effect will be needed if cyber weapons are to be used as a military weapon (The
Economist, 2010). Cyber weapons have also been described to impact warfare more than ordnance (United
Press International, 2014). Combatant commanders and mission planners rely upon validated weapon and
target information to determine the probability of success for mission scenarios by matching kinetic weapons
to targets. Particularly, the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs) provide damage probabilities for
specific weapons and threats, physical and functional characteristics of munitions and weapon systems, threat
vulnerability, obscuration on weapon effectiveness, and analytical techniques and procedures for assessing
munitions effectiveness (U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, 2016). JMEMs allow a standardized
comparison of weapon effectiveness across all three service communities – the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This
provides combatant commanders a necessary capability - to determine the best combination of weapon
ordnance and tactics to attack and render enemy systems and structures inoperable. These combatant
commanders will not utilize cyber warfare without knowing the effects it will produce or the potential
collateral damage that may occur. Hence, a similar capability for OCO is deemed necessary or the United
States military will cede this aspect of warfare to adversarial parties. Plans to enable the U.S. military to
conduct a “combined arms campaign across all domains – land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace” makes it
clear that there has to be shift from strictly using kinetic weapons to one that combines with cyber weapons
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2012). Similar attempts have been ongoing in other parts of DoD, e.g., Air Force
CyberWorkx which tries to leverage Functional Mission Analysis (FMA) to effectively transition the
communication mission to the cyber mission and develop specialized skill sets required for the Air Force’s
Mission Defense Team operations (Collins, Chiaramonte, & McMinn, 2017).

2. Current Assessment of Kinetic Weapons
The process established to assess kinetic weapons allows an analyst to assess the physical interactions
between ordnance and the threat and to determine if the resulting damage is sufficient to negate the threat’s
mission. The current basic process to assess kinetic weapons can be summarized in three phases: 1) threat
assessment, 2) weapons characterization, and 3) damage definition.
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2.1 Threat assessment
Once a threat system is identified, intelligence is collected on the threat to identify its critical system elements.
A schematic model is created of the physical interconnectivities of components and, if appropriate, the
significant crew members of the threat system. This model is created using combinations of tools like Fault
Trees and Failure Modes and Events Analysis (FMEA). Once a desired damage level is associated with the
threat, a complementary mirror model of failures for the system components is developed to indicate which
components are relevant to affect the intended damage. Component vulnerabilities are estimated based on
test data, computational physics hydrocode analyses, or engineering level analyses and may include use of
penetration equations and specialized algorithms, e.g., Jacobs-Roslund equation for explosive detonation
(Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, 2014).
2.2 Weapons characterization
Characterizing weapons is done using standard data collection methods appropriate to weapons’ effects on
the threat system and environments. Threat assessment information from the previous phase is used together
with information specific to weapons, e.g., fragmentation data is collected for fragment masses, shape,
velocities, and material, and penetration data is collected for projectiles and shaped charge devices.
Engineering-level simulation codes may be utilized to determine the expected engagement geometry with the
threat system.
2.3 Damage definition
An analyst can pair the threat with a weapon and perform an effectiveness estimate. This estimate provides a
probability of damage given a hit on the threat and is dependent upon the munition characteristics, the threat
vulnerability, the damage definition criteria, the velocity and orientation at impact. Examples of damage
definitions is shown in Table 1 (adapted from Driels M. R., 2013).
Table 1: Examples of damage definitions
Target Type
Land Vehicles
Parked Aircraft
Personnel (standing)

Damage Definitions
K – catastrophic kill (not repairable); M0 – mobility kill (cannot move, immediately; M40 –
mobility kill (cannot move within 40 minutes); F – firepower kill (cannot fire)
PTO – repairs requiring at least 5 minutes; PTO4 – repairs requiring at least 4 hours; PTO24 –
repairs requiring at least 24 hours
Defense (prevent) within 30 seconds; Assault (prevent) within 30 seconds; Assault (prevent)
within 5 minutes; Supply (prevent) within 12 hours

Eventually, the effectiveness of a weapon is defined as the Probability of Kill (P K) and is the function of several
probabilities, such that
Pk = f (Ptrk , Peng , Pho , Pdisc , Ps , Pmsl , Ph , Pd|h , Pk|d)
Where
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Ptrk is the probability that the target is acquired and tracked
Peng is the probability that the target is engageable (within the weapon system performance envelope)
Pho is the probability that handover occurs between the search sensor and the fire control sensor
Pdisc is the probability that the weapon system can discriminate the target from decoys or clutter
Ps is the probability that the platform or overall system (excluding weapons itself) performs reliably
Pmsl is the probability that the weapon will perform reliably, including propulsion, guidance, and fuzing
functions
Ph is the probability of the weapon hitting the target
Pd|h is the probability of damage to the target given a hit
Pk|d is the probability of a kill given the damage level

Simulation codes such as Advanced Joint Effectiveness Model and Effectiveness ToolBox are used to calculate
these terms. Figure 1 illustrates a typical effectiveness equation for a missile intercept event (Zurasky, 2015).
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Figure 1: Kinetic System Effectiveness Kill Chain

3. Inherent Differences Between Cyber Weapons and Kinetic Weapons
Weapons can impart damage to threats through physical means such as blast, fragment penetration, and heat.
For example, a high explosive blast causes injuries in the lungs, gastrointestinal tract, and ears in humans and
damage in equipment compartments and manned spaces in buildings and vehicles. For laser weapons, the
concentrated beam of visible or invisible light is converted to heat, increasing the temperature of a material
and causing weakening and deformations.
However, cyber weapons interact with threats in a different way, as summarized in Table 2. Cyber weapons act
on logical rather than physical interconnectivities of components and significant crew members. Cyber
weapons allow compromise of computers and processors by identifying important data to manipulate, steal,
or destroy, i.e., affects its Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. Cyber weapon penetration into a system is
not achieved physically. Instead of exploiting the laws of physics as kinetic weapons do, cyber weapons
leverage inter-computer protocols and human-in-the-loop to gain access to threat computers. Some cyber
weapons engage networking and administrative tools to probe and map networks and to conduct lateral
movements across networks while others manipulate the computer code to alter the output of algorithms.
Furthermore, cyber weapons do not come with an explosive charge. Instead, physical and logical damage must
be created by the targeted system to itself through stopping or altering ongoing processes (Rid and McBurney,
2012). The existing definitions for mobility damage and firepower damage still apply to cyber weapons for
those effects that cause physical damage. On the other hand, not all cyber weapons may be capable or
designed to directly contribute to Crew damages.
Table 2: Summarized differences of kinetic and cyber weapons
Threat assessment by…

Target systems penetration
using…
Latency
Damage caused by…

Damage persistence...
Types of damage…

Kinetic weapons
physical interconnectivities of
components and significant crew
members
laws of physics

Immediate
laws of physics; physical means
such as blast, fragment
penetration, and heat effects
Various
Direct damage to mobility,
firepower, and crew
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Cyber weapons
Logical interconnectivities of components and
significant crew members
inter-computer protocols, processes, and
procedures; system design and architecture;
human-in-the-loop; social engineering
From immediate to indeterminate
manipulation of software and information;
targeted system to itself through stopping or
altering ongoing processes
Various
Direct & indirect damage to mobility, and
firepower; indirect damage to crew
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4. Paradigm Shift to Cyber Weapons Assessment
As in the case for kinetic weapons, the objectives of a cyber weapon effectiveness and effectiveness prediction
process are to promote consistency and improve weapon system evaluation accuracy across DoD. Without a
proper assessment and prediction process, commanders will remain reluctant to employ cyber weapons.
Consistency is implemented through a common set of definitions and assumptions that are used by each of
the Services to produce weapon system performance estimates. This commonality ensures that significant
differences, if any, are attributable to the weapon system and threat characteristics rather than the methods
employed by the individual Services. Also, standardization facilitates a common interpretation and meaningful
comparison of weapon system performance. Thus, the predictions delivered by a cyber effectiveness analysis
are likely to be accepted by the warfighting community.
Given the ever expanding and emerging cyber realm, and hence also the capabilities of cyber weapons, the
effectiveness and effectiveness prediction methodology must be robust enough to be tailored to suit each
analysis. That means there must be some common structure that gives the analyst leeway to develop
assessments against threats and for damage effects not yet encountered.
For timely acceptance across the Services, a cyber effectiveness methodology must have some parallelisms
with that for the more established kinetic weapons. However, the emerging nature of the cyber realm would
necessitate a precursory phase of constant survey of potential cyber effects. Hence, a cyber effectiveness
methodology may include the following phases, as shown in Figure 2: Identification and definition of cyber
damage effects, Cyber threat assessment, Cyber weapon characterization, and Cyber effectiveness estimate
generation.

Figure 2: Proposed cyber effectiveness methodology
4.1 Identification and definition of Cyber damage effects
The first element of the common structure is an updated and common set of damage criteria. In some cases, a
cyber weapon may enact effects that cause physical damage like a kinetic weapon not possible in the recent
past. For example, a new asymmetrically discovered Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) vulnerability (i.e.,
unpublished Zero-Day Vulnerability) may allow a cyber weapon that causes a servo controller to turn off and
induce the same failures to a flight system as those caused by a penetrating projectile damaging the same
servo controller. However, once this vulnerability becomes symmetrically known, then effectiveness may be
reduced using patches deployed to affected PLC’s. This and other types of added variation in cyber effects
makes the prediction of cyber weapon effectiveness problematic. The outcomes of some of these effects do
not directly correspond to existing kinetic weapon damage definitions. Cyber-specific damage effects may
include those listed in Table 3.
These and other possible types of effects that may emerge need to have quantifiable metrics associated with
them to be usable in the field. Two important metrics both based on time are how rapid the effect sets in
(latency), and the associated duration period (persistence), as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Cyber effects, brief description, and sample metricification (adapted from Zurasky, 2017)
Cyber damage
Unavailability of
network resources

Misinformation

Brief description
Computer, communication, or network resources are
made unavailable to intended users by temporarily or
indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to
the Internet (e.g., similar effect to Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attack)
false or incorrect information is spread intentionally to
affect down-stream processes and procedures

Data Modification

data is inserted, deleted, or altered in a manner that is
intended to appear genuine to the user to affect downstream processes and procedures

Data Repudiation

data or information is made to appear to be invalid or
misleading to affect down-stream processes and
procedures

Spoofing

an attempt to masquerade as someone else

Sample metrics
Latency: immediate
Persistence: 5 minutes (DoS), four
hours (DoS4), or 24 hours (DoS24)

Latency: gradual
Persistence: 5 minutes (MisI), four
hours (MisI4), or 24 hours (MisI24)
Latency: immediate to gradual
Persistence: 5 minutes (DMod), four
hours (DMod 4), or 24 hours (DMod
24)
Latency: immediate
Persistence: 5 minutes (DRep), four
hours (DRep 4), or 24 hours (DRep
24)
Latency: immediate
Persistence: indeterminate

4.2 Cyber Threat Assessment
Like kinetic weapon assessments, a multi-phase cyber effectiveness threat vulnerability assessment must
include the following: (1) threat selection, (2) threat modeling, and (3) identification of component
vulnerabilities.
4.2.1 threat selection
In threat selection, the analyst will identify the threat and begin to gather baseline information. This will
include a brief description of the threat, relevant photos or schematic drawings, top level failure analysis logic
trees, and a list of assumptions pertinent to the analysis.
4.2.2 threat modeling
In threat modeling, the analyst will begin to develop a threat model to include a detailed description of the
threat, a network model (if appropriate), and a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). For a cyber
evaluation, the physical components of the threat are not significant. Instead, the software code and its
functional elements are the items to be evaluated. The system boundaries are important when developing the
network model. The key aspect of threat modeling is to identify the critical functional elements and the
conditions that need to be altered in order to change the state of the threat system and achieve the desired
effect. For example, the FMEA can identify a servo controller as a single point failure node. A well-designed
cyber weapon can then alter the state of the servo causing loss of system control.
4.2.3 vulnerability assessment
In vulnerability assessment, the analyst will identify the vulnerability of the identified critical cyber
components, including how it can be exploited, i.e., access, trigger, and impact. The vulnerability can be
considered as an element (flaw or designed) in the software or environment that can be exploited. These
elements (both flaws and designed) becomes vulnerabilities when exploitation path are identified. Otherwise,
these may simply be inert elements. Vulnerabilities can exist in the threat system design, within installed
software, within its network configuration, or be associated with its business operations. Some known
vulnerabilities and actual incidents of exploitation are shown in Table 4 (adapted from Sood and Enbody,
2014).
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Table 4: Cases of exploited vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Types
Backdoors and
Hardcoded
Passwords

Description
hardcoded passwords embedded in the
firmware that allow attackers gain
complete access

Vulnerable Systems Examples
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems
(SCADA) provided by Siemens, TURCK, etc. were
vulnerable (TURCK CVE, 2012)

Insecure
Authentication and
File Uploading

security issues arising from inability of
the systems to implement granular
control through proper authentication
and authorization checks

• Global Positioning System (GPS) Satellite
Communication (SATCOM) systems provided by
Harris, Cobham, JRC, Iridium and Hughes were
vulnerable (Warner, et al., 2012)

Remote Code
Execution

security issues such as buffer
overflows, memory corruption,
privilege escalations, dangling pointers
in operating system components,
browsers, critical systems such as
ICS/SCADA, routers, other software
such as Microsoft Office, Adobe
Reader, Java, etc.

SQL Injections

weaknesses in web applications that
allow attackers’ queries to be executed
directly in the backend database

Insecure Protocols,
Spoofing and
Hijacking

undocumented and insecure protocols
allow hijacking and spoofing of
communication channels

• SCADA systems provided by ICONICS GENESIS32,
BizViz, IntegraXor, Sielco Sistemi, etc. were
vulnerable to Buffer Overflows (InfoSec, 2011)
• XMLDOM Zero-day vulnerability was exploited to
attack U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars’ website
(Gonsalves, 2014)
• Operation Pawn Storm uses vulnerabilities in MS
office files to target U.S. military officials (Paganini,
2014)
• Royal Navy website hacked using SQL Injection
(BBC News, 2010)
• U.S. Army website hacked using SQL Injection
(Dark Reading, 2010)
Common Channel Signaling System 7 (CCSS7) in the
US or Common Channel Interoffice Signaling 7
(CCIS7) in the UK,(The Guardian, 2016)
• Possible attacks to spoof GPS communication to
control U.S. drones (Schwartz, 2011)

All the various cyber components must be listed with their associated vulnerabilities. This will provide the
cyber weapon designer with a complete description – equivalent to the kinetic weapon Threat Geometry
Model – against which to choose the most appropriate available cyber capability to cause damage.
4.3 Cyber weapon characterization
A cyber weapon is a software capability by which an attacker exploits a vulnerability within a target system to
cause damage. None of the kinetic weapon characteristics apply (e.g., warhead fragmentation and blast
overpressure data, guidance methods, fuse functions, and reliability). Instead, new characteristics will have to
be developed. These should be categorized according to cyber weapon’s functional responsibilities of
Reconnaissance, Lateral Movement, Payload Deployment.
4.3.1 Cyber Reconnaissance
In order to penetrate and exploit an adversarial network, some aspect of the cyber weapon will require
networking reconnaissance tools to map out the threat network, to probe potential avenues, and to monitor
activities. The weapon will be required to locate the desired target components and identify ways to get to
them, i.e., cyber access to exploit vulnerabilities. By utilizing host and port scan applications to map out the
network resources, the weapon will develop an inventory of relevant target components. The reconnaissance
characterization should include descriptions of its function and the operational environment in which it
operates. Lightcyber (2016) notes that 99% of reconnaissance and lateral movement threats originated from
legitimate applications and only 1% originated from malware. Some of the more popular networking and
hacking reconnaissance tools include Angry IP Scanner, PingInfoView, and Nmap.
4.3.2 Lateral movement
Once the target system has been successfully penetrated, the cyber weapon may have to extend across the
network to the vulnerable component. It will do so by using lateral movement applications. Lateral movement
facilitates the attacker to maintain presence in the network, gain control of the administrative privileges, and
move to the key vulnerable components. The lateral movement characterization should include descriptions of
its function and the operational environment in which it operates. Some of the more popular administrative
tools for lateral movement include SecureCRT, Putty, and BeyondExec Remote Service.
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In addition, remote desktop tools are used to move laterally within a network and to remotely control
elements. Legitimate Information Technology administrators use them to manage networks, but cyber
weapons can use them to control elements that have been compromised. Some of the more popular remote
desktop tools for lateral movement are TeamViewer, WinVNC, and Radmin.
4.3.3 Payload deployment
In addition to the reconnaissance and lateral movement functions, a cyber weapon may deploy a payload.
Payload refers to the component of a computer code that executes an activity that is unwanted by the
targeted system, i.e., to trigger the exploited vulnerability. This does not include the reconnaissance and
lateral movement code required to get the payload packet to its destination. Some example effects of
payloads are data exfiltration, manipulation or destruction, interrupted or inconsistent messages, and the
delivery of spam emails through an infected user's account. The payload characterization should include
descriptions of its function and the operational environment in which it operates or would remain dormant.
For example, the characterization should indicate that it exfiltrates data from computers that utilize the
Windows 10 operating system but will not be active in other variants of Windows OS.
4.4 Cyber offense effectiveness estimate generation
The effectiveness estimate of cyber weapons is the point in the process where the analyst predicts the
outcome of the use of a weapon on a specific threat system in a specified environment, e.g., impact of
vulnerability exploitation. Determining Probability of Kill (PK) for a kinetic weapon system is often used by
logisticians to determine weapon load-out and by mission planners to develop tactics. Commanders must have
confidence in the effectiveness of weapons before using them, and especially important when physical
damage may not be evident as confirmation.
An effectiveness equation for a typical missile intercept event was illustrated in Figure 2. It was pointed out
that much of the uncertainty, and the associated probabilities, occur after the engagement begins. Similar kill
chain models for cyber engagements have been previously developed by Lockheed Martin and Mandiant (now
FireEye) for an advanced persistent threat (APT) attack (Holmes, 2015). In both there are distinct stages of the
engagement. The durations of these stages are much longer than the stages of a kinetic engagement. In
addition, the pre-compromise stage where reconnaissance occurs is actually prior to the engagement start,
i.e., prior to when the commander wants to engage the cyber weapon.
The cyber equivalent to the kinetic equation in Figure 1 can be expressed as:
P = f(P
k

,P

Latent

Access

,P

Config

,P

Map

,P

Tempo

,P

Patch

,P ,P
IT

Exploit

)

Where
x PLatent, PAccess, PConfig, PMap, and PTempo are the probabilities based on the intelligence gathered on the
latency of information, access points, hardware and software configurations, completeness of network
map, understanding of operations tempo
x PPatch and PIT are probabilities based on likelihood of that vulnerabilities being exploited are patched
and IT’s ability to detect and respond to the delivery of the cyber payload
x PExploit is the probability that the payload will achieve the desired mission effects
Figure 3 shows the resulting cyber effectiveness equation for a path through a hypothetical network (from
Zurasky, 2017).
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Figure 3: Cyber effectiveness equation for a hypothetical network
4.5 Example cyber offense effectiveness generation: Chemical weapons facility
This section describes an example of how the proposed cyber weapon effectiveness methodology may be
applied to a hypothetical scenario partly based on the vulnerability of the ABB Power Generation Information
Manager (PGIM), identified as CVE-2019-18250 (CVE, 2019), and described in Kovacs (2019).
4.5.1 Phase 1: Identification and definition of cyber damage effects
In early November of 2019, a chemical weapons facility was identified as a threat and a desired damage effect
was determined to be a gradual interruption of its operation lasting at least 24 hours by injecting incorrect
equipment control information, i.e., MisI24 from Table 3.
4.5.2 Phase 2: Cyber threat assessment:
After the threat was identified and a desired damage effect was determined, intelligence was gathered
through various ways. Significant information is summarized as follows:
x The facility uses ABB Power Generation Information Manager (PGIM) 800xA systems version 5.x, a
distributed, open client/server architecture for collecting, archiving and consolidating data from
various equipment
x Excel add-ins are used to performs basic arithmetic functions (e.g., water/steam chart calculations)
used by machine operators, technicians, and maintenance crew
x The administrators’ Windows credentials are the same as the ones for PGIM
4.5.3 Cyber weapon characterization
After threat assessment, cyber reconnaissance was conducted, and the following significant information was
gathered:
x There is only one information network for the entire facility
x Encryption method used in transmitting information is outdated
x The network is behind a weak firewall
x Access into the network from the outside is through VPN, but is not strictly enforced
x The facility always employs two IT personnel using outdated scanning methods
A zero-day vulnerability (ZDV) for all versions of ABB Power Generation Information Manager (PGIM) was
identified which makes a network using PGIM vulnerable to authentication bypass, which may allow an
attacker to remotely bypass authentication and extract credentials from the affected device. Being a ZDV, this
vulnerability is not known to the public and has no known patch. Because threat assessment showed that the
facility’s PGIM credentials are the same as the Windows domain administrator credentials, it was determined
that the path for lateral movement in the network would be to snoop these credentials.
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A team of coders then developed and tested an exploit code on ABB 800xA systems version 5.x which bypasses
authentication and default security architecture to reveal usernames and passwords in the system.
4.5.4 Cyber effectiveness estimate generation
For simple illustrative purpose, the probabilities may be expertly judged to be low (0.01), moderate (0.05), and
high (0.1) based on the preceding phases. These values are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5: Cyber effectiveness estimates for chemical weapons facility example
PLatent
PAccess,
PConfig,
PMap,
PTempo
PPatch
PIT
PExploit

High; Information is very current
High; VPN not strictly enforced
High; well documented, based on manufacturer setting; single network
High; well documented; weak firewall
High
High; no patch exists
Moderate; only two personnel are employed using outdates scanning methods
High; exploit code is tested and verified

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.05
0.1

The function of Pk = f(*) used is a modified version proposed by Zurasky (2017) where the 8-th root is obtained
to make very small numbers more user-firendly.
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5. Cyber defense effectiveness estimate generation
Anti-goal approach has been proposed as one way to create failure scenarios from a top-down approach (e.g.,
Pinto, Tolk, and Landaeta, 2010), and can be appropriately used to transform the cyber offense effectiveness
equation into a cyber defence effectiveness equation. That is, if cyber offensive mean increasing the likelihood
of cyber weapon effectiveness, maximizing Pk, then cyber defence means maximizing (-Pk), or equivalently,
minimizing Pk. Hence, the defensive duality of cyber effectiveness equation is:
Minimize P = f(P , P
k

Lat

Access

,P

Config

,P

Map

,P

Tempo

,P

Patch

,P ,P
IT

Exploit

)

Broadly, this equation can be the basis for developing cyber defense strategies, such as
x Focused counterintelligence on access points, hardware and software configurations, and network
map and architecture to keep adversary’s PLatent, PAccess, PConfig, PMap, and PTempo at their minima
x Comprehensive patching to assure most current and complete patches are deployed to minimize PPatch,
x Well trained and equipped IT with ability to detect and respond to cyber payloads to minimize P IT
5.1 Example cyber defense effectiveness generation: Chemical weapons facility
This section briefly describes how the proposed cyber weapons effectiveness methodology may be applied for
defensive purpose, through the extension of the earlier chemical weapons facility scenario.
By late November 2019, the vulnerability of PGIM was revealed publicly by Kovacs (2019). As a response, the
chemical weapons facility applied the following cyber defense strategies as suggested by Bodforss (2019) and
US-CERT (2019). These strategies are summarized in the following:
x Segmenting the chemical production network into several networks instead of a single network for the
entire facility and layered security architecture was implemented to slow down lateral movement into
these networks
x More controlled access to PGIM using stronger firewall and stricter implementation of VPN for access
outside of the network
x Windows domain user credentials were removed from PGIM
x IT personnel were increased and more advanced intrusion scanning, and detection technologies were
implemented, and various profiles of possible exploit codes made public (e.g., GITHUB, 2019) were
analyzed by IT personnel for faster identification, if intrusion occurs

388

C. Ariel Pinto and Matthew Zurasky

Correspondingly, the resulting effectiveness estimate – both for purpose of offense or defense - can be
summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Cyber effectiveness estimates for chemical weapons facility example (defense)
PLatent
PAccess,
PConfig,
PMap,
PTempo
PPatch
PIT
PExploit

High; Information is very current
Low; VPN now strictly enforced; Windows administrators’ credentials removed from PGIM;
more secure firewall
Low; hardware and software settings not default and unknown to outside
Moderate; network is segmented, and security is layered
High
High; no patch exists
Low; increased IT personnel and monitoring
Low; exploit code known and can be easily detected

0.1
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.1
0.1
0.01
0.01

ఴ

From Table 6, the resulting Pk = ξͷିͲͳݔଵଷ ൌ ͲǤͲ͵. As expected, cyber defense strategies may result to
decrease in cyber effectiveness estimate and the proposed cyber weapon effectiveness method was shown to
be able applicable to both offensive and defensive purposes

6. Summary and Conclusion
A cyber weapon effectiveness and effectiveness prediction process was derived from similarities and
differences between cyber and kinetic weapons, with the objective of promoting consistency and improving
accuracy of weapon system evaluation across DoD. The four phases of this process are 1) Identification and
definition of cyber damage effects, 2) Cyber threat assessment, 3) Cyber weapon characterization, and 4)
Cyber effectiveness estimate generation. Furthermore, cyber defense strategies can be mirrored from this
same offensive process, e.g., focused counterintelligence, comprehensive patching, and capable IT program.
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